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WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
VII. INSURANCE LAW
Defining the Scope of Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Virginia:
Harleysville v. Nationwide
The Virginia General Assembly enacted the Uninsured Motorist Statute'
in 1958 to address the growing problem of uncompensated automobile
accident victims in Virginia. 2 The Uninsured Motorist Statute requires every
automobile liability policy issued in Virginia to include a provision against
the risk of injury caused by a negligent, financially irresponsible motorist.'
A financially irresponsible motorist is a motorist who neither buys insurance
nor has financial resources sufficient to compensate automobile accident
victims.4 Before receiving compensation from his uninsured motorist carrier
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
2. See A. WmssS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE 1-15 (2d ed.
1985) [hereinafter A. Wmiss]. To protect the public from the increasing number of financially
irresponsible motorists, various state legislatures enacted financial responsibility laws in the
1930s that encouraged motorists to acquire insurance if the motorist lacked resources adequate
to satisfy potential damage claims for serious injuries. Id. at 6. The financial responsibility
laws were inadequate because of the huge increase in the number of automobiles and automobile
accidents after World War II that resulted in a growing problem of uncompensated automobile
accident victims. Id. Accordingly, various state legislatures considered enacting compulsory
insurance laws or creating state unsatisfied judgment funds. Id. at 11. The insurance industry
suggested a new uninsured motorist coverage that indemnified victims for injuries caused by
negligent, uninsured motorists. Id.; see also Note, The Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Virginia
and New Underinsurance Provisions, 69 VA. L. REv. 355, 357 n.4 (1983) (discussing growing
number of uncompensated automobile accident victims).; I. SCHERmmR, 2 AuToMoatE LrAftrry
INSURANCE 23.01 (2d ed. 1986) (state authorities became more aware that victims of financially
irresponsible motorists were increasing). By 1978, 48 states had enacted uninsured motorist
statutes that reflected the proposal of the insurance industry. ScHERMER at 23.01.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(A) (Repl. Vol. 1986). Section 38.2-2206 (A) of the
Virginia Uninsured Motorist Statute applies to all motor vehicle insurance policies issued to
any vehicle principally used or garaged in Virginia. Id. The limits of the uninsured motorist
coverage mandated by section 38.2-2206 (A) match the limits of the insured's liability insurance
coverage. Id.; see Note, supra note 2, at 355-57 (1983) (discussing history and enactment of
Virginia's uninsured motorist statute). The Virginia General Assembly favored the new coverage
over previous financial responsibility laws because the insurance more effectively protected
innocent victims of uninsured motorists. Note, supra note 2, at 355-57; see Hobbs v. Buckeye
Union Gas Co., 212 F.Supp. 349, 352 (W.D. VA. 1962) (object of statute is to afford
additional protection in event of accident with uninsured motorist); Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Wells, 209 F. Supp. 784, 791 (W.D. Va. 1961) (in enacting Uninsured Motorist Statute, Virginia
General Assembly intended to provide benefits and to protect insured motorists, their families,
and permissive users of their vehicles) reversed on other grounds 316 F.2d 770.
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (B) (RepI. Vol. 1986). Section 38.2-2206 (B) of the
Virginia Code defines an uninsured motorist vehicle as a motor vehicle that has no bodily
injury liability insurance in the amounts specified by section 46.1-1(8). VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-
2206 (B) (Repl. Vol. 1986); see VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-1(8) (providing minimum automobile
liability policy limits). The minimum insurance limits for uninsured motorists are the same as
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for injuries caused by an uninsured motorist, a claimant must secure a
judgment against the negligent, uninsured motorist.- The claimant's judg-
ment establishes the legal liability of the uninsured motorist and entitles the
claimant to a recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage of his insur-
ance policy.6 After the insurance carrier has paid benefits to the claimant,
the statute subrogates the insurance carrier to the claimant's rights against
the uninsured motorist.
7
Although Virginia's Uninsured Motorist Statute provides protection for
an insured against negligent, uninsured motorists, the legislature did not
define explicitly the scope of protection mandated by the statute.8 For
example, the Virginia statute is silent on whether an injured claimant may
seek compensation under his uninsured motorist coverage for injuries caused
by a negligent, uninsured motorist if compensation is available from a joint
tortfeasor involved in the same accident.9 In Harleysville Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.'0 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a plaintiff who has
the minimum liability limits for ordinary liability insurance. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-1 (8) (RepI.
Vol. 1986). The minimum liability limits for automobile insurance policies issued in Virginia.
are $25,000 to one person per accident for bodily injury or death, $50,000 to more than one
person for bodily injury or death, and $10,000 for property damages. Id.
Furthermore, section 38.2-2206 (B) of the Virginia Code provides that a vehicle is
uninsured if a motorist has insurance coverage within the statutory minimum but the insurer
denies coverage for any reason. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (B) (Repl. Vol. 1986). Section
38.2-2206 (B) also provides that a motor vehicle is uninsured if its owner or operator is
unknown. Id.
5. See Note, supra note 2, at 358 n.6 (plaintiff first must obtain judgment against
uninsured motorist that establishes liability of uninsured motorist carrier).
6. See Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 216 Va. 926, 928, 223
S.E.2d 901, 902 (1976) (holding that judgment is event that establishes legal entitlement to
recovery from owner or operator of uninsured vehicle); A. Wmiss, supra note 2, at 45 (most
states do not require insured to obtain judgment before he may collect under his uninsured
motorist coverage).
7. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(G) (1986) (providing that uninsured motorist carrier
has right of subrogation to insured's claims against negligent tortfeasor); see, e.g., White v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 785, 787 (1966) (uninsured motorist carrier has right of
subrogation when insured has received full satisfaction of his judgment against uninsured
driver); General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance, Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 208
Va. 467, 471-72, 158 S.E.2d 750, 754 (1968) (after paying insured victim, statute subrogates
victim's insurer to all of victim's rights against uninsured motorist); United States Fidelity
Guar. Co. v. Byrum 206 Va. 815, 818, 146 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1966) (same); see also D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAWS OF RE EDmS 250-52 (1973) ("subrogation" allows one person to
take second person's place regarding latter's legal rights and remedies against third person).
Subrogation originated as an equitable remedy that prevented the unjust enrichment of the
insurer. Id.
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing scope of Virginia's uninsured
motorist statute).
9. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text ( Harleysville court considering whether
Virginia's Uninsured Motorist Statute provides protection to insured when adequate compen-
sation is available).
10. 789 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1986).
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obtained a judgment against both an insured and uninsured motorist may
satisfy the judgment under his uninsured motorist coverage before exhausting
the insured's liability insurance."
In Harleysville Joel Hollingsworth sustained injuries in an automobile
accident with two other motorists. 2 Richard Baker, one of the other two
motorists, was an employee of LaValleys Wholesale Florist, Inc., which
owned the company truck that Baker was driving. 3 The identity of the
third motorist involved in the accident was unknown. 4 Hollingsworth ob-
tained a joint and several judgment of $100,000.00 in the Circuit Court of
Henry County against Baker, LaValleys, and the unknown motorist."
LaValleys' insurance carrier, Harleysvile Mutual, voluntarily paid Holling-
sworth $50,000 of the judgment.' 6 Hollingsworth then demanded in writing
that his insurance carrier, Nationwide Mutual, satisfy the judgment under
his policy's uninsured motorist coverage. 7 Nationwide refused Holling-
sworth's demand because LeValleys' insurance coverage with Harleysville
exceeded Hollingsworth's entire judgment. 8  Harleysville Mutual peti-
tioned the Circuit Court of Henry County, Virginia, to declare the rights
and liabilities of the two respective insurance companies regarding Holling-
11. Id. at 273-74.
12. Id. at 273.
13. Id. In Harleysville LaValleys insured the truck that Baker was driving with a liability
insurance policy issued by Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company that contained a liability
limit of $300,000 for bodily injury to one person. Id.
14. See id. (neither Baker nor Hollingsworth could establish identity of unknown mo-
torist). The unknown motorist in Harleysville had driven onto the highway in front of Baker's
truck, causing the truck to jackknife, Id. Hollingsworth, driving directly behind the truck,
was unable to stop his vehicle in time to avoid the collision. Id.
15. Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 273; see VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (B) (Repl. Vol. 1986)
(statute provides that if owner or operator is unknown, then motor vehicle is uninsured).
Section 38.2-2206 (E) of the Virginia Code provides that when the driver of a motor vehicle
responsible for damages is unknown, the injured party may sue the unknown tortfeasor as
"John Doe." VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (E) (Repl. Vol. 1986); see also John Doe v. Brown,
203 Va. 508, 509, 125 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1962) (defendant John Doe is fictitious person created
under Uninsured Motorist Statute to stand in place of unknown motorist); Comment, Virginia's
Experience with the Uninsured Motorist Act, 3 W.& M. L. REv. 237, 239 (1962) (although
injured insured's insurance company defends John Doe action as though it were party
defendant, primary function of action is to establish liability of unknown motorist and to
assess damages).
16. See Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 273 (pending outcome of Harleysville's declaratory
action in Henry County Circuit Court, Harleysville paid Hollingsworth $50,000 under La-
Valleys' liability insurance policy).
17. Id. In Harleysville Hollingsworth demanded the entire $100,000 judgment from
Nationwide pursuant to his uninsured motorist coverage. Id. Nationwide had insured Holling-
sworth with an automobile liability insurance policy containing an uninsured motorist provision
limit of $100,000. Id. Explaining that a plaintiff can receive only one satisfaction of his
judgment, however, the district court in Harleysville found that Hollingsworth could request
only the remaining balance of $50,000. Id.
18. Id. at 273.
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sworth's judgment. 19 Based on diversity of citizenship, Nationwide removed
the action to the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia.20 The district court declared that Harleysville should pay the entire
$100,000 judgment rendered against Baker, LaValleys, and the unknown
motorist.21 The district court stated that Hollingsworth's uninsured motorist
coverage should satisfy the judgment only if no other source of indemni-
fication existed.? The district court determined that Nationwide was not
liable to Hollingsworth under his uninsured motorist coverage because
LaValleys' coverage under its policy with Harleysville exceeded Holling-
sworth's entire judgment. 23 The district court concluded that Hollingsworth,
therefore, must proceed directly against Harleysville to satisfy the entire
judgment.2 4 Subsequently, Harleysville appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
2 5
19. Id. In Harleysville, Harleysville's complaint named as parties Harleysville, Nation-
wide, Hollingsworth, and the unknown motorist. Id.; see W. R-z, VmRGIiA AuToioB.E
LIBu=.rr INSURANCE, 21-1 (1983 & Supp. 1984). When disputes arise concerning automobile
liability coverage under a single policy, or two or more policies, an insurance carrier may
resolve the dispute through a declaratory judgment proceeding. W. Rrrz, supra, at 21-1.
Ordinarily, an insurance carrier will join all of the parties so that the decision will bind each
of them. Id.
20. Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 273; see Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 605 F.Supp. 133, 135 (W.D. Va. 1985) (district court determined that John Doe was
not indispensible party and that plaintiff had established requisite diversity to maintain federal
jurisdiction).
21. Harleysville, 789 F.2d. at 273; see Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 605 F. Supp. 133, 136 (W.D. Va. 1985). The district court in Harleysville determined
that Hollingsworth had a source of recovery from LaValleys' policy with Harleysville. Id. The
district court held that because LaValleys' applicable policy limits were greater than Holling-
sworth's total judgment, Hollingsworth should proceed directly against Harleysville. Id.
22. See Harleysville, 605 F. Supp. at 136. In considering Harleysville's claim that
Nationwide was obligated to pay one-half of Hollingsworth's judgment against Harleysville
and John Doe, the district court in Harleysville reasoned that if Nationwide paid one-half of
Hollingsworth's judgment to Harleysville, then Harleysville would benefit from Hollingsworth's
uninsured motorist coverage. Id. The district court cited a previous Fourth Circuit decision to
support that uninsured motorist coverage should not benefit anyone other than the insured.
See Southern v. Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co. 236 F. Supp. 370, 372 (W. D. Va. 1964)
(because Virginia General Assembly intended that uninsured motorist coverage should benefit
only injured insured, other joint tortfeasor could not seek contribution from uninsured motorist
carrier). The district court in Harleysville held that indemnification by an uninsured motorist
carrier should not benefit anyone other than the insured. Harleysville, 605 F. Supp. at 136.
23. Harleysville, 605 F. Supp. at 136. In considering the uninsured motorist provision
in Nationwide's policy to Hollingsworth, the district court in Harleysville found that Nationwide
was not liable under any theory of contract or contribution. Id. The district court reasoned
that Hollingsworth's uninsured motorist coverage was available only if no other source of
compensation was available. Id. Noting that LaValleys' $300,000 policy limit exceeded Hol-
lingsworth's entire judgment, the district court held that Nationwide was not liable to Hol-
lingsworth pursuant to his uninsured motorist coverage. Id.
24. Id. The district court in Harleysville held that Hollingsworth's judgment entitled him
to collect the efitire $100,000 judgment against Harleysville. Id. The district court also held
that Nationwide had no liability under Hollingsworth's uninsured motorist coverage because
LaValley's insurance policy limits exceeded the total amount of the judgment. Id. Finally, the
district court declared that Hollingsworth should proceed directly against Harleysville to collect
the entire judgment. Id.
25. Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 273.
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On appeal the Fourth Circuit in Harleysville noted that in Virginia a
personal injury plaintiff has the right to elect from which joint tortfeasor
he will collect his judgment.26 The Fourth Circuit determined that Holling-
sworth could satisfy his judgment against any of the three defendants
because Hollingsworth had obtained a judgment against Baker, LaValleys,
and the unknown motorist. 27 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the




In considering Harleysville's contention that the district court erred in
finding that Nationwide was not liable to Hollingsworth, the Fourth Circuit
examined the terms of the insurance policy that Nationwide had issued to
Hollingsworth. 29 The Fourth Circuit found that Nationwide had contracted
with Hollingsworth to compensate Hollingsworth for any injuries that he
sustained in an accident with the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle.30 In addition to Nationwide's contractual obligation, the Fourth
Circuit also considered the remedial purposes of Virginia's Uninsured Mo-
torist statute to determine that Hollingsworth's policy obligated Nationwide
to pay Hollingsworth.31 The Fourth Circuit determined that the district
court's judgment in favor of Hollingsworth established the joint liability of
the unknown motorist.32 The Harleysville court held that, therefore, the
uninsured motorist provision in Hollingsworth's policy obligated Nationwide
to satisfy the judgment if Hollingsworth sought collection from Nation-
wide.33 Concluding that an insurance carrier should not deprive an insured
of his uninsured motorist coverage, the Fourth Circuit in Harleysville
26. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-443 (Repl. Vol. 1986) (providing no bar to plaintiff's
action until full satisfaction of judgment).
27. Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 273; see VA. CODE Am. § 8.01-443 (Repl. Vol. 1986) (after
obtaining judgment against several joint tortfeasors, plaintiff can proceed to collect his
judgment from joint tortfeasor of his choice, but can have only one satisfaction of judgment).
28. Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 275.
29. See Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 274 (Fourth Circuit found that Nationwide had con-
tracted to pay Hollingsworth for any injuries caused by negligent, uninsured motorist).
30. See id. (discussing Nationwide's liability insurance policy issued to Hollingsworth
that undertook to pay Hollingsworth all damages legally attributable to uninsured motorist).
31. Id.
32. Id.; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (judgment against owner or operator
of uninsured motor vehicle is event that legally entitles plaintiff to recovery from his uninsured
motorist coverage).
33. See Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 274 (Fourth Circuit determining that Nationwide was
liable contractually to Hollingsworth). The Fourth Circuit in Harleysville noted that for the
payment of a premium, Nationwide had promised to compensate Hollingsworth for any of
his injuries caused by an uninsured motorist. Id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Holling-
sworth, therefore, could elect to recover from Nationwide under his policy's uninsured motorist
coverage. Id.; see General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 208 Va. 467, 473, 158 S.E.2d 750, 755 (1968) (insurer's liability is contractual in nature
and arises under Uninsured Motorist Law when court of competent jurisdiction establishes
liability of uninsured motorist).
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reversed the district court's holding that Nationwide was not liable to
Hollingsworth1
4
Having determined that Nationwide was liable to Hollingsworth, the
Fourth Circuit addressed Harleysville's final claim, that the district court
incorrectly held that Hollingsworth should collect the entire judgment di-
rectly from Harleysville.3 5 The Harleysville court stated that even if Nation-
wide satisfied all or part of Hollingsworth's judgment, Nationwide's statutory
right of subrogation enabled Nationwide to pursue any other source of
contribution available to Hollingsworth.16 The Harleysville court held that
Nationwide, therefore, could seek reimbursement from Hollingsworth's claim
against Baker, LaValleys, and their insurer, Harleysville.3 7 Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Harleysville
ultimately must satisfy Hollingsworth's entire judgment."8
The Fourth Circuit in Harleysville properly concluded that Virginia law
permitted Hollingsworth to satisfy the entire judgment from Harleysville."
Section 8.01-443 of the Virginia Code provides that a personal injury
plaintiff may elect from which joint tortfeasor he will satisfy his judgment.
40
Stressing a plaintiff's right to election under section 8.01-443 of the Virginia
34. See Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 275. The Fourth Circuit in Harleysville stated that an
injured plaintiff should not have to endure months of delay while jointly liable insurance
carriers determined which insurance carrier is ultimately liable for the plaintiff's judgment. Id.
The Fourth Circuit determined that, accordingly, a plaintiff may collect from either insurance
carrier without interference from the other. Id. Noting that the General Assembly intended
the uninsured motorist statute to benefit injured persons and that the statute is remedial in
nature, the Fourth Circuit held that Hollingsworth could collect his entire judgment from
Nationwide. Id.
35. Id. at 275; see also infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing Nationwide's
subrogation rights against Harleysville).
36. Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 275. The Fourth Circuit in Harleysville noted that Nation-
wide was not the insurer of the uninsured motorist. Id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
because Nationwide was liable to Hollingsworth only for the injuries caused by the unknown
motorist, Nationwide had no obligation to satisfy judgments that other injured motorists could
obtain against the unknown motorist. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that, therefore, if Nationwide
paid any portion of Hollingsworth's judgment, then Harleysville must reimburse Nationwide
pursuant to Nationwide's statutory right of subrogation. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206
(G) (RepI. Vol. 1986) (uninsured motorist statute providing right of subrogation to uninsured
motorist carrier); supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing subrogation of insurance
carrier to insured's claim).
37. Id. at 275.
38. Id.
39. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (declaring that Hollingsworth could
satisfy entire judgment from Harleysville).
40. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-443 (Repl. Vol. 1984). Section 8.01-443 of the Virginia
Code provides that a judgment against one joint tortfeasor is not a bar to prosecuting the
action against other joint tortfeasors. Id. Accordingly, under the Virginia Code an injured
plaintiff may bring separate actions against each joint tortfeasor or sue them jointly until his
judgment is satisfied. Id. Section 8.01-443 also provides that no bar to the plaintiff's action
arises until full satisfaction of the plaintiff's judgment. Id.
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Code, the Virginia Supreme Court in Fitzgerald v. Campbell4' held that an
injured plaintiff may bring separate actions against joint tortfeasors and
may proceed against each joint tortfeasor until his judgment is satisfied.
42
In Fitzgerald the plaintiff obtained judgment against only six of the joint
tortfeasors for assualt and battery.43 A sheriff, however, executed the
plaintiff's judgment against one of the defendant joint tortfeasors before
the plaintiff had chosen which joint tortfeasor he wanted to satisfy his
judgment. 44 Unwilling to accept satisfaction from the joint tortfeasor against
which the sheriff had executed judgment, the plaintiff sued Campbell, a
joint tortfeasor who the plaintiff did not obtain a judgment against in the
first action.45 Reversing the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action
against Campbell, the Virginia Supreme Court in Fitzgerald noted that
although the plaintiff can enforce only one satisfaction of his judgment,
each joint tortfeasor remains liable to the plaintiff until the plaintiff satisfies
his entire judgment. 46 The Fitzgerald court determined that a judgment is
not fully satisfied under the statute unless the plaintiff voluntarily has
elected from which joint tortfeasor he will satisfy his judgment.47 Accord-
ingly, the Virginia Supreme Court in Fitzgerald allowed the plaintiff to
satisfy his judgment against Campbell."
The Fourth Circuit in Harleysville, like the Virginia Supreme Court in
Fitzgerald, determined that a plaintiff has the right to elect from which
joint tortfeasor he will satisfy his judgment. 49 Because Hollingsworth's
judgment entitles him to satisfy his judgment from the unknown motorist,
LaValey's or Baker, the Fourth Circuit correctly declared that Holling-
sworth could elect to satisfy his judgment from any of the three defendants.
50
Thus, although the Fourth Circuit did not require Hollingsworth to satisfy
his judgment from LaValleys' or Baker, or from their insurer Harleysville,
41. 131 Va. 486, 109 S.E. 308 (1921).
42. See id. at 490-491, 109 S.E. at 310 (considering plaintiffs right to elect joint tortfeasor
against whom to proceed to satisfy plaintiff's judgment). Before the case of Fitzgerald v.
Campbell, a judgment against one of several joint tortfeasors, whether satisfied or not, barred
any action against the others. Id. at 490, 109 S.E. at 310.
43. Id. at 487, 109 S.E. at 308.
44. Id. The plaintiff in Fitzgerald had wanted to obtain a judgment against Campbell,
who was a joint tortfeasor but not a defendant in the action. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 494, 109 S.E. at 311 (plaintiff's action not barred until full satisfaction).
The Virginia Supreme Court in Fitzgerald stated that the plaintiff had 'he right to satisfy his
judgment against any of the joint tortfeasors. Id. The Fitzgerald court reasoned that, accord-
ingly, the plaintiff also had the right to await the trial and the result of his action against
Campbell before satisfying his judgment. Id. at 491.
47. Id. at 494, 109 S.E. at 311.
48. Id.
49. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiff's right of election
against joint tortfeasors).
50. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing Hollingsworth's joint judgment
against Baker, LaValleys and unknown motorist).
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Hollingsworth, nonetheless, could elect to satisfy the entire judgment from
Harleysville."
Although the Harleysville court correctly held that Hollingsworth could
elect to satisfy the entire judgment against Harleysville, some authority
suggests that the Fourth Circuit incorrectly held that Hollingsworth, likewise,
could elect to satisfy his judgment from Nationwide.5 2 In Hobbs v. Buckeye
Union Casualty,3 the District Court for the Western District of Virginia
held that Virginia's uninsured motorist law does not create insurance for
uninsured motorists.14 In Hobbs, the plaintiff was a paying passenger in an
automobile that collided with an unknown motorist.5 The plaintiff initiated
an action against the driver of the vehicle in which he was a passenger and
against the unknown motorist.5 6 After satisfying the plaintiff's judgment,
Buckeye Union Casualty Company, the insurer of the vehicle in which the
plaintiff was a passenger, removed the action to the Western District Court
of Virginia and sought contribution from the plaintiff's uninsured motorist
carrier.17 Stating that the purpose of the statute was to protect the insured
against inadequate compensation, the Hobbs court determined that unin-
sured motorist coverage would be available when other sources of compen-
sation were not available. 8 The Hobbs court held that the plaintiff's
uninsured motorist coverage was not available for contribution to Buckeye
because Buckeye represented another available source of compensation to
51. See Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 274 (holding that Hollingsworth's judgment against
LaValleys' allowed plaintiff to seek full satisfaction directly from Harleysville).
52. See, e.g., Pulley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 242 F. Supp. 330, 336 (E.D.Va. 1965)(Virginia
General Assembly enacted Uninsured Motorist law to provide adequate compensation for
injured insured when other sources were unavailable); Southern v. Lumberman's Mut. Casualty
Co., 236 F.Supp. 370, 372 (W.D.Va. 1964)(stating that Virginia law did not create insurance
for uninsured motorists and holding that Virginia's uninsured motorist statute insures insured
only against inadequate compensation); Hobbs v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 212 F. Supp. 349,
351-52 (W.D.Va. 1962)(intent of Virginia General Assembly in enacting uninsured motorist
statute was to provide uninsured motorist coverage only when other sources were unavailable);
see also infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text ( Hobbs court permitting uninsured motorist
coverage when other sources are unavailable).
53. 212 F. Supp. 349 (W.D.Va. 1964).
54. See id. at 351 (declaring that Uninsured Motorist Statute did not provide insurance
for uninsured motorist).
55. Id. at 350.
56. Id. (plaintiff suffered extensive injuries and obtained judgment in Circuit Court of
Washington County, Virginia against driver and unknown motorist).
57. Id. In Hobbs, Celina Mutual Insurance Company issued uninsured motorist coverage
to the plaintiff. Id. The Hobbs court stated that Celina's autimobile liability policy to the
plaintiff was contingent on the lack of other sources of compensation to the plaintiff. Id.
58. Id. at 352-53. ( Hobbs court determining plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage not
available for contribution). In Hobbs the District Court for the Western District of Virginia
stated that although courts enforced contribution between joint wrongdoers, the plaintiff's
insurance carrier was not the insurer of the uninsured motorist. Id. at 351. The Hobbs court
held that, accordingly, Buckeye has no right to seek contribution from the plaintiff's uninsured
motorist coverage. Id. at 353.
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the plaintiff. 9 Accordingly, the District Court for the Western District of
Virginia dismissed Buckeye's claim for contribution from the plaintiff's
uninsured motorist coverageA6
While Hobbs implies that the Fourth Circuit should not have allowed
Hollingsworth a right of election against Nationwide unless other sources
of compensation were unavailable, Virginia court precedent suggest that
Nationwide's uninsured motorist coverage obligated Nationwide to compen-
sate Hollingsworth, regardless of the availability of other sources of com-
pensation.61 Under section 38.2-2206(A) of the Virginia Code62, an insurance
carrier must compensate an insured for any injuries caused by an uninsured
motorist.63 Examining Virginia's uninsured motorist law, the Virginia Su-
preme Court in John Doe v. Brown64 stated that an insurance carrier must
issue automobile liability insurance policies according to the Uninsured
Motorist Statute.65 In Brown the plaintiff was a passenger in a motor vehicle
involved in an accident with an unknown motorist. 6 The plaintiff sued the
driver of the automobile in which he was a passenger and, also, sued the
unknown motorist. 67 After obtaining judgments against the driver and the
unknown motorist, the plaintiff sought compensation from his uninsured
motorist carrier under his policy's uninsured motorist provision.6" Stating
that the plaintiff failed to give the uninsured motorist carrier proper notice
of the action, the carrier refused to satisfy the plaintiff's judgment and
appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 9 On appeal the
Virginia Supreme Court in Brown noted that the insurance company received
59. Id. (holding that plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage not available when another
source of compensation exists). The Hobbs court determined that Buckeye was the insurance
carrier for the driver and also was the insurer of any passenger against injury from an unknown
motorist. Id. at 351. The Hobbs court further determined that the plaintiff's uninsured motorist
carrier provided additional protection to the plaintiff if no other compensation was available.
Id. at 351-52. The Hobbs court held that Buckeye, therefore, was the primary insurance carrier
and that the plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage was not available for contribution. Id.
60. Id. at 353. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia in
Hobbs v. Buckeye Union Casualty Co. recognized that Virginia law allows contribution from
the insurer of one joint tortfeasor to the insurer of another joint tortfeasor. Id. The Hobbs
court held that an uninsured motorist carrier, however, was not the insurer of an unknown
motorist. Id. The court concluded that, therefore, a joint tortfeasor could not compel
contribution from the uninsured motorist carrier. Id.
61. See infra note 62-73 and accompanying text (discussing Nationwide's contractual
obligation to Hollingsworth under Hollingsworth's uninsured motorist provision).
62. VA. CODE Ar. § 38.2-2206(A) (Repl. Vol. 1986).
63. See Id. (provides that all motor vehicle liability insurance policies in Virginia must
include coverage that protects insured from negligent uninsured motorists); see also supra notes
3-4 and accompanying text (statute mandating insurance protection against negligent uninsured
motorists).
64. 203 Va. 508, 125 S.E.2d 159 (1962).
65. Id. at 513, 125 S.E.2d at 163.
66. Id. at 510-11, 125 S.E.2d at 163.
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an additional premium from the injured insured for accepting the additional
risk of injury by an uninsured motorist.70 The Brown court held that the
insurance policy, therefore, obligated the insurance carrier to pay all sums
to the injured insured that were attributable to the uninsured motorist's
negligence.7'
Like the Brown court, the Fourth Circuit in Harleysville emphasized the
contractual obligations in the insured's policy with his uninsured motorist
carrier. 72 Because Hollingsworth's judgment entitled him to recover from
the uninsured motorist, the Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that Nation-
wide would remain contractually liable under Hollingsworth's policy until
Hollingsworth satisfied his judgment.7 3 By emphasizing the contractual
obligations of Hollingsworth's insurance policy, the Fourth Circuit rejected
the district court's interpretation of Hobbs as suggesting that uninsured
motorist coverage is available only when other sources of compensation do
not exist. 74 Instead, the Fourth Circuit determined that the availability of
other sources of compensation did not affect Hollingsworth's right to elect
from his uninsured motorist coverage to satisfy his judgment. 75
In addition to Nationwide's contractual obligation to Hollingsworth
under his policy's uninsured motorist provision, the underlying purpose of
Virginia's uninsured motorist law supports the Harleysville court's holding
that Nationwide is liable to Hollingsworth.7 6 Courts that have construed
Virginia's Uninsured Motorist Statute have held that the statute is remedial in
nature and that the legislature intended the statute to benefit injured persons. 77
70. Id. at 513, 125 S.E.d at 163.
71. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court in Brown stated that a plaintiff proceeds against
the unknown motorist as "John Doe", not against the insurance company. Id. The Brown
court explained that Virginia's Uninsured Motorist statute provides that John Doe is a fictitious
person who stands in the place of an unknown motorist. Id. The defendant in Brown alleged,
however, that the plaintiff had failed to give the defendants proper notice of his action and
that, therefore, the defendant was denied due process. Id. at 510, 125 S.E.2d at 162. The
Virginia Supreme Court in Brown held that the alleged constitutional grounds that would
permit the insurance carrier to escape liability would allow the insurance carrier to avoid its
contractual obligation to the plaintiff. Id. at 513, 125 S.E. at 163.; see VA. CODE ANN. §
38.2-2206 (E) (Repl. Vol. 1986) (allowing plaintiff to obtain judgment against uninsured
motorist through John Doe action).
72. See Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 274. The Fourth Circuit in Harleysville stated that
Nationwide had contracted with Hollingsworth to pay Hollingsworth all sums that his judgment
legally entitled him to against the uninsured motorist. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 275 (Fourth Circuit in Harleysville holding that uninsured motorist coverage
is available despite other available sources of indemnification). But cf. supra note 58 and
accompanying text ( Hobbs court determining that uninsured motorist coverage is available
when other sources of compensation are inadequate).
75. Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 275.
76. See infra notes 77-83 (discussing courts that construe liberally the Virginia Uninsured
Motorist Statute to benefit insured motorist).
77. See, e.g., Wood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 432 F. Supp. 41, 43 (1977)(courts
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The Virginia Supreme Court in Bryant v. State Farm,8 for example, held that
courts should construe the statute liberally to protect an injured insured from
inadequate compensation." In Bryant the plaintiff obtained a judgment against
the driver and owner of an uninsured automobile.8" The plaintiff had coverage
under his father's liability insurance policy and also under a liability insurance
policy that State Farm had issued directly to him."' Allowing the plaintiff to
seek compensation under both policies, the Virginia Supreme Court in Bryant
noted that under Virginia's Uninsured Motorist Statute an insurance carrier
must compensate an injured person for any injuries attributable to an unin-
sured motorist.8" The Bryant court held that the Virginia legislature intended
that the statute afford broad insurance coverage to benefit persons injured by
an uninsured motorist.
8 3
To determine the scope of Hollingsworth's uninsured motorist coverage
in Harleysville, the Fourth Circuit followed the approach that the Virginia
Supreme Court in Bryant v. State Farm exemplifies. 4 By stressing that the
Virginia General Assembly enacted Virginia's Uninsured Motorist Statute
for the benefit of insureds injured by negligent uninsured motorists, the
Harleysville court intended to secure for the plaintiff a right of election
against his uninsured motorist carrier despite the availability of other sources
of compensation. 5 By emphasizing this right of election, the Fourth Circuit
has overcome any implication from the Hobbs decision that a right of
election exists only when other sources of compensation do not exist.86
should construe liberally Virginia's uninsured motorist statute).; Tudor v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
216 Va. 918,921, 224 S.E.2d 156, 158 (1976)(courts consistently have held that uninsured
motorist statute is remedial in nature and that courts should construe liberally statute for
protection of qualified claimants); Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897,
900, 140 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1965)(uninsured motorist statute enacted for benefit of injured
persons and courts should construe liberally the statute for that purpose); McDaniel v. State
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 815, 820, 139 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1965)(same).
78. 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
79. Id. at 900, 140 S.E.2d at 820.
80. Id. at 898, 140 S.E. at 818.
'81. Id.
82. Id. at 899, 140 S.E.2d at 818. The Virginia Supreme Court in Bryant noted that
section 38.2-2206 (A) (formerly § 38.1-381) of the Virginia Code required uninsured motorist
protection in every liability insurance policy issued in Virginia. Id.; see supra note 3 and
accompanying text (discussing section 38.2-2206 (a) of Virginia's Uninsured Motorist Statute).
83. Bryant, 205 Va. 897, 900, 140 S.E.2d at 820. The Bryant court stated that State
Farm's provision that limited the plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage was contrary to
Virginia's uninsured motorist law. Id. Noting that the Virginia General Assembly intended the
statute to afford broad coverage, the Bryant court held that the State Farm provision was
invalid. Id. at 902, 140 S.E.2d at 820.
84. Compare id. (construing Virginia's Uninsured Motorist Statute to afford broad
coverage to insureds); with supra notes 33-34 and' accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in
Harleysville holding that Virginia General Assembley intended statute to benefit injured persons
and that statute is remedial in nature).
85. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit rejecting Hobbs court's
holding that plaintiff has right of election when other sources of compensation do not exist);
supra notes 59 & 60 ( Hobbs court determining that right of contribution is available when
other sources are inadequate).
86. Id.-
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After determining that Nationwide remained liable to Hollingsworth, the
Fourth Circuit correctly held that after Nationwide paid any portion of
Hollingsworth's judgment under his uninsured motorist coverage, the statute
subrogated Nationwide to Hollingsworth's claims against any joint tortfeasor
and their respective insurance carriers.8 7 The Virginia Supreme Court in
United Services Auto Association (U.S.A.A.) v. Nationwide Mutual Insur-
ance Co." examined section 38.2-2206 (G) of Virginia's Uninsured Motorist
statute and held that section 38.2-2206(G) subrogated the insurance carrier
to the rights of the insured against any negligent party.8 9 In U.S.A.A. the
plaintiff suffered injuries in an automobile accident.9° The plaintiff iniated
an action for damages against the defendant and received judgment. 91 The
defendant's insurer, however, refused to compensate the plaintiff because
the insurer claimed that it had cancelled the defendant's policy. 92 United
Services compensated the plaintiff under her uninsured motorist coverage. 93
Claiming that Nationwide, the defendant's liability insurance carrier, had
cancelled the defendant's policy wrongfully, United Services sued Nationwide
for reimbursement pursuant to its right of subrogation. 94 Affirming the trial
court, the Virginia Supreme Court in U.S.A.A. stated that the statute
expressly grants subrogation rights to an uninsured motorist carrier who
has satisfied an insured's claim and determined that United Services, there-
fore, was the beneficiary of its insured's rights against the defendant's
insurance carrier.9 5 Accordingly, the United court allowed United Services
to seek contribution from Nationwide. 96
The Fourth Circuit in Harleysville, like the Virginia Supreme Court in
U.S.A.A., correctly applied section 38.2-2206 (G) of the Virginia Uninsured
87. Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 275.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(G) (Repl. Vol.
1986)(provision subrogating insurance carrier to rights of insured); supra note 7 (discussing
cases and statute that subrogates victim's insurer to all of victim's rights against uninsured
motorist).
88. 218 Va. 861, 241 S.E.2d 784 (1978).
89. See id. at 864, 241 S.E.2d at 788 (discussing right of subrogation after insurance
carrier pays judgment). The Virginia Supreme Court in United Services Auto Association
(U.S.A.A.) v. Nationwide Mut.Ins. Co. noted that section 38.2-2206(G) is the only provision
of Virginia's Uninsured Motorist Statute that allows subrogation to the claimant's uinisured
motorist carrier. Id.
90. Id. at 862, 241 S.E.2d 785.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 863, 241 S.E.2d 786.
93. See id. at 862, 241 S.E.2d at 785. In the U.S.A.A. case, United Services Automobile
Insurance Association had issued the plaintiff a liability insurance policy. Id. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company insured the negligent driver of the other automobile involved in
the accident. Id. Nationwide denied coverage because it had cancelled the defendant's policy
before the accident. Id.
94. See id. at 863, 241 S.E.2d at 785 (United Services alleging that Nationwide wrongfully
denied insurance coverage to defendant).
95. Id. at 864, 241 S.E.2d at 788' In United the Virginia Supreme Court noted that
United Services as beneficiary could have no greater rights than the rights of its insured.
96. Id.
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Motorist Statute which provides subrogation rights to an uninsured motorist
carrier who has satisfied its insured's claim. 97 Like the insurance carrier in
U.S.A.A., Nationwide, after paying any part of Hollingsworth's judgment,
is the beneficiary of its insured's rights against the defendant's liability
insurance carrier.9 The Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that because
Virginia's Uninsured Motorist Statute subrogates Nationwide to Holling-
sworth's claim against Harleysville, Hollingsworth ultimately would collect
the entire judgment from Harleysville."
In Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co., the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff, injured in an automobile
accident by an insured and uninsured motorist, could elect to satisfy his
entire judgment against either joint tortfeasor.10 The Fourth Circuit also
held that when an uninsured motorist is a joint tortfeasor, a plaintiff's right
of election extends to his uninsured motorist carrier pursuant to his policy's
uninsured motorist coverage.' 0 Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that if the
uninsured motorist carrier pays the plaintiff any portion of the plaintiff's
judgment, Virginia's Uninsured Motorist Statute subrogates the carrier to
the plaintiff's rights against the other joint tortfeasors. 0 2 In Harleysville the
Fourth Circuit focused on the immediate needs of an injured insured rather
than which insurance company ultimately would pay benefits to the plain-
tiff.103 Liberally construing Virginia's Uninsured Motorist Statute and relying
on the confractual relationship between the insurance carrier and the insured,
the Fourth Circuit rejected the implication in favor of awarding uninsured
motorist benefits only if other sources of compensation are unavailable.'0 4
Courts construing Virginia's Uninsured Motorist Statute should recognize
that allowing an insured to elect against his uninsured motorist coverage
when other sources of compensation are available furthers the Virginia
97. See Harleysville, 789 F.2d at 275 (holding that Nationwide has right of subrogation
against Harleysville); see also supra notes 7 and accompanying text (discussing section 38.2-
2206 (G) of Virginia Code which provides right of subrogation to uninsured motorist).
98. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in Harleysville declaring
that Virginia Uninsured Motorist Statute subrogated Nationwide to Hollingsworth's claim
against Harleysville).
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in Harleysville found
that Hollingsworth has right to elect against Harleysville to satisfy entire judgment).
101. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit determined that
Hollingsworth's uninsured motorist provision contractually obligated Nationwide to Holling-
sworth).
102. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit declared that Nation-
wide's statutory rights of subrogation enabled it to pursue any source of contribution that
was available to Hollingsworth).
103. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit stressed that courts should
allow expeditious collection of plaintiff's judgment from any liable source).
104. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit stressing contractual
relationship between Hollingsworth and his uninsured motorist carrier); supra notes 34, 76 &
77 and accompanying text (General Assembly intended broad coverage to an injured insured).
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